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It is competent for the prosecuting officer to explain his positions and
illustrate the testimony by diagrams as well as by word of mouth. This
was all the use that was made of the plans. No witness who hears a
conversation can be excluded from testifying in relation to it because it
was not addressed to him, and the party to whom it was addressed is a
witness in the case.
Ample opportunity was allowed to contradict any government witness,
or to show the aninus of any such witness toward the prisoner.
The evidence offered and excluded was purely immaterial. We find
no good cause for a new trial, upon a careful consideration of the whole
/
case, and accordingly the entry must be,
Exceptions overruled.
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BANKRUPTCY.

Purchaserof Claims-When nayprove,-A party who in good faith
purchases claims against a bankrupt with the intention of stopping proceedings and giving him time, should not be deprived of participation
in the estate : I, re Strachan, D. C. West. Dist. Wis., 3 Bissell.
To enable him to prove them, however, lie should take an assignmeat.
A simple receipt of payment is not sufficient: 1.
Such claims should be proven as of date of adjudication, but may
draw interest to date of actual payment: 11.
The Bankrupt Act should not be so strictly construed as to prevent a
debtor from making every effort to extricate himself from bankruptcy
proceedings : 11.
The forms prescribed in the General Rules are not binding, but may
be altered to suit circumstances : 1Td.
Insolvency-A Condition of Fuct. not of Belief.-To render a mort-

gage void under the thirty-fifth section of the Bankrupt Act it is not
necessary that the debtor knew or believed himself insolvent. The
section treats of insolvency as a condition of fact, not of belief, and
with knowledge of which and its consequences he is chargeable in law:
Hall v. Wayer, C. C. West. Dist. Wis., 3 Bissell.
From J. 1t. Bisell, Esq., Reporter; to appear in Vol. 3 of his Reports.
2 From Edwin B. Smith, Esq., Reporter : to appear in 61 Me. Reports.
2 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, to appear in Vol. 65 of his Reports.
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It follows, as a logical sequence, that when a nin insolvent in fact
gives a mortgage to one existing creditor he does so with a view to give
him a preference: 1d.
The Act of 1841 declares void preferences made by a party contemplating bankruptcy; the Act of 1867 includes those made by a party
being insolvent, and the decisions under the former act are not always
applicable to the present statute : M.
The purpose of the act being to enforce the equal distribution of the
estate, every act of an insolvent that tends to defleat that purpose should
be construed strictly as against him, and courts should indulge every
presumption permissible by the well settled rules of law to secure the
full benefit of this cardinal principle of the law : 11.
The strict definition of insolvency usually given in commercial centres
should not be applied in country places. A party should be held insolvent only when he fails to meet his debts according to the usages and
customs of the place of his business-the rule should be in harmony
with the general custom of the place : 11.
If an insolvent give a mortgage to a creditor who has reasonable cause
to believe him insolvent, the fraud upon the Bankrupt Act is complete
as to both : 1(.
The question as to the creditor is whether he "had reasonable cause
to believe" the debtor insolvent-not what he did believe ; the latter is
immaterial. The creditor is not constituted the sole judge of the sufficiency of the evidence of his debtor's insolvency-that is fur the court
to determine, the security being attacked : 11.
Where a debtor had, during two years, paid off only a small portion
of an overdue debt, had sold out the stock of goods for which the
account was made, and transferred a part of the paper received therefor,
had applied for extensions and been refused, had previously declined to
execute a mortgage on the ground that it would injure his credit, and
had been pressed by his different creditors-these thcts constitute reasonable cause for belief of insolvency, and the creditor cannot escape
from the consequences of knowledge of them: I.l
Insolvent Partneisz-Trsteesfor Firm Credltors-Trans.fer to Copartner.-When partners are in fact insolvent, they should be considered in equity as holding the partnership effects in trust for the benefit
of the firm creditors, and cannot by a transfer of the interest of one to
the other defeat this trust: In re Cookc and Gleason, D. C. West. Dist.
Wis., 3 Bissell.
A sale by one partner to his copartner, when the firm is insolvent
and on the eve of bankruptcy, is presumptively fraudulent as to the firm
creditors, and the courts should set it aside and distribute the property
as firm property: Id.
The legal effect of such transfer being to change the order of payment
and prefer certain creditors, the private creditors over the firm creditors,
it would be void as creating a preference contrary to the proyisions of
section 35 of the Bankrupt Law: Id.
Partner can file .Petition after Receiver appointed.-The bankrupt
court has jurisdiction of a petition by one partner to have the firm declared bankrupts, though proceedings are pending in a state court to
wind up the partnership, and a receiver had been appointed who had taken
possession of the assets: In re Noonan, C. C. East. Dist. Wis., 3 BisselL
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Such a petition being voluntary as to him, it is not necessary that there
should be an act of bankruptcy alleged : M.
A dissolution by the act or all or any of the partners does not put an
end to the power of' the bankrupt court : Id.
So long as any unfinished business, debts, credits, or assets remain,
the bankrupt court has jurisdiction, a proper case being made : .rd.
.re Jurisdiction f Amount reduced below that speeifed in the ActCosts cannot le ,bled,, to give Jurisdiction-NorCounsel .ces.-The District Court has no jurisdiction of an involuntary case in bankruptcy,
unless it appears on the trial that the debtor, at that time, owes debts
provable under the act exceeding the sum of three hundred dollars, and
is indebted to the petitioning creditors in the amount of two hundred
and fifty dollars. This is true even through the debtor, at the time of
the filing of the petition, was indebted to exceed those sums. When
his indebtedness, by subsequent payments, is reduced below those sums,
the court loses jurisdiction : In re Shelley, D. C. North. Dist. Ill., 3
Blissell.
The latter clause of the forty-first section of the act was intended to
allow the debtor to disprove on the trial all the material allegations of
the petition : .I
Payments made by the debtor to the petitioning creditors are material facts on the issue on denial of batnkruptcy, and the debtor can introduce evidence of such payments without a special traverse of the
amount of his indebtedness: 11.
'fihe rec(il)t of such payments by the petitioning creditors to an
amount sufficient to reduce this indebtedness below the minimum established by the act, must be considered as a waiver of the alleged act of
bankruptcy: P.
The petitioning creditors cannot add the costs paid and incurred.by
them to their debt in order to raise it above the jurisdictional limit.
Such costs are not a part of their debt. The debtor must owe them two
hundred and fifty dollars or they have no right to make costs. Nor can
the creditors add counsel fees to their debt: Pi.
In this case, the respondent, having been guilty at the time of the
filing of the petition, was ordered to pay all costs up to the time of filing
his denial, except the docket fee : Rd.
BILLS AND NOTES.

See Pleading.

CERTIORAR.

A party is entitled to a common law certirarito review the determination of a body or officer acting judicially, when he has no other remedy : The People ex rel. Akin v. Morgan et al, 65 Barb.
'Toentitle a party to a certiorari,lie or it must have an interest -in
the proceedings that are intended to be brought up by it: Id.
The court, in reviewing proceedings, in certiorari,is governed by the
return of the officers or body to whom the writ is directed. It will not
take into consideration papers annexed to the return : id.
CONSTITUTIONAL JAW.
commissions and their acts, during
M ,oilitars
the late civil war, in states where the courts were undisturbed, were unconstitutional : Milligan v. Jlorey, C. C. Ind., 3 Bissell.
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Liability !f .]b'mbers an'? of Army Officers.-The members of such
comunissi,,ns, and oteers ,ofthe United States ariny, are liable for arrest

and imprisonment ordered by them in such states, even though ratified
and approved by the Executive Department of the Government: l.
They are also liable for imprisonment suffered beyoid their jurisdiction, if such imprisonment was the natural and necessary result of the
sentence pronounced by them : d.
Limitation of Action.-The limitation imposed by the Act of Congress of March 3d 1863, was within the power of Congress, and binding
upon state tribunals : R.
The defendants are not liable for any acts, nor any portion of the
term of imprisonment, prior to two years boiure the conmmencement of
the action; the statute begins to run notwithstanding that the imprisonment was a continued act : 11.
It seems that an Act of Congress would not. be complete justification,
if the trial by a military commission was forbidden by the Constitution:
!Id.

Damages.-The damages to be allowed should be compensatory, and
not exemplary or punitive : .Ild.
CRI MINAL LAW.

Hanslaughter.-In this case the jury were instructed that, if the respondent, " in the heat of blood, and upon sufficient provocation," threw
the deceased down stairs, the offence was manslaughter ; subsequent instructions showed that this word " sufficient" was used as equivalent to
the words "great and sudden :" Behllthat the prisoner had no cause for
exceptions : State v. Murphy, 61 Me.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

See Surety.

Poor Debtor's Bond-Oath not in form of the Statute.-k poor debtor's bond approved by justices not selected agreeably to the statute, is
good only at common law : Smith v. Brown, 61 Me.
It is in compliance with the conditions of such bond if the oath taken
be that mentioned therein, though this differ from the one poor debtors
are required to take by the statutes in force at the time of its administration: Id.
If such bond provide for notice to the creditors of debtor's disclosure,
but fail to say how such notice shall be served: service upon one of
them is sufficient:

I.

No appraisal of demands disclosed upon a proceeding under a common law bond is necessary unless required by the terms of the obligation: Id.
The record of the justices hearing such disclosure held sufficient,
though not showing that they were disinterested, or why the creditor
did not select one of them, nor where they met, nor that any disclosure
was had: .d.
Poor Debtor's Bond-lurisdiction of J"ustices-Pe formqnce--To
entitle a poor debtor to chancery of his bond, the justices hearing his
disclosure must be selected according to law, and have jurisdiction over
that particular disclosure ; otherwise the executin and fee- will be the
measure of damages. Blake v. Brackett, 47 Maine 28, affiried ; Foss

-
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v. Edwards, 47 Maine 145, overruled sc far as relates to the question
of damages: Hackett v. Lane, 61 Me.
The only bar to an action upon a poor debtor's bond is a complete
fulfilment of one of its three alternative conditions, i. e. payment of
debt, surrender of debtor to the jailor, or a disclosure : Id.
Plea ot performance estops debtor from claiming that the bond, by
reason of' non-comlornmity to the terms of the statute, is only good at
common law, and so subject to chancery : id.
DIVIDENDS.
A dividend earned, but not declared, belongs to the person owning
the stock when the dividend is actually declared, and not to the person
who was owner of the stock prior to such declaration : Brundage v.
Brundage, 65 Barb.
DOWER.

See Husband and Wife.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

Condenmtion-Juliciary Act-l,,isdiction of -Federal Courts extends to subsequent Cases.-A proceeding under an Act of Congress to
condemn property is a "suit of a civil nature at common law or in
equity," within the meaning of the Judiciary Act: U. S. v. Block
121, C. C. North. Dist. Ill., 3 ]3issell.
The construction of that clause cannot be limited to such suits as
were known at the time of the passage of the act. Whenever an act
is passed which authorizes the commencement of a suit, jurisdiction of
the case is thereby vested in the Federal courts, if the character of the
parties warrants it, and it comes within the meaning of the statute.
The grant of power in this act is prospective : d.
The clause, "suits of a civil nature at comnmn law or in equity," was
used in contradistinction to admiralty and criuminal eases. it does not
restrict the jurisdiction to old and settled forms, but includes all suits
in which legal rights are to be ascertained and determined : Id.
Congress has power to clothe the Federal courts with authority to proceed for the condemnation of property in conformity with a particular
state statute : (1.
Though the officers of the government had stated to the owners of
the ground the price which the government was willing to give, yet if
other parties had liens and claims against the property, which they were
not willing to surrender, condemnation proceedings are necessary : id.
The Secretary of the Treasury being the mere officer of the government, whem proceedings are instituted by him under a special law they
become necessarily proceedings on the part of the United States; and
although the petition be filed by the district attorney, it is within not
only the spirit, but the letter of the Acts of Congress: Id.
EQUITY.

See Partnership; Trustee.

FLOWAGE.
FRAUD.

See Pleading.
See Insurance.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
HUSBAND AND WIvu.

Sce Nale.
See Trust ee.

Proniscof 17fc to pay Husband's Dcbt.-A married woman is not
liable upon a special promise to Irty her lisband's debt, niade in his
lifetime, if it be not in writing, and in such form as to bind her beparate

estate: Lennox et al v. Eldred, 65 Barb.
Neither is a verbal promise to pay such debt, made after the dee(e,..
of her husband, a valid promise. It is, at best, a simple proniisc it pay
tho debt of another, and is without consideration, and void by the 6tatute

of Frauds : .11.
Doicer-I
nfant Fcme Covert.-Prior to Acts of 1S63, e. 215 (It. S.
o. 103, § 6), a minor feyne covert could not bar her right to dower by
joining in the execution of her husband's deed for that purpose; such
deed was voidable by her, on attaining her majority: Dela v. Stanwood(, 6 Me.
That act (c. 215, Acts of 1863) could not defeat the existing right
of a widow to dower: 11.
INFANT.

See .THusband and TT;c; 1Removal of Causes.

INSOLVENT.

See Bankriptcy; Debtor and Credltor.
INSURANCE.

Over-valtation-Frand-Nez Tried.-Whct her an over-valuation
and proof of loss b6 fraudulentor not, is a question of fltet for the jury;
and where there is " much conflict of testimony," and that adduced by
plaintiff is sufficient, if believed, to justify a verdliet in her fhvor, such
verdict will not be set aside if the discrepancy between the value of the
property as fbund by the jury, and the amount iniured thereon be not
so great as to render it incredible that tli over-valation in the application, and over-estimate in the proof of' loss, could have oceurred without positive dishonesty or fraudulent intent on the part of the plaintiff:
Williams v. Phenix Ins. Co, 61 Me.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

See Constitutional Law ; P rtnersldp.

MILITAtY COMMISSION.

See ConstitutionalLaw.

MORTGAGE.

Of Plants and Shrubs-Accretion by, Growtlt of.-Plants and shrubs,
the growth of cuttings from plants and shrubs minrtg-agel, pass to the
mortgagee by accession : Bryant v. Pennell, 61 Me.
PARTNERSHIP.

See Pleading.

Equity-J'artnerhp Accounts- Limitations, Staftte of-AecointDemant.-Whcre, in a bill in equity a.zainst several defenldants. al of
whom appear, and all but one allow the bill to be taken pro confesso,
the existence of a common interest in property, and the transaction of
a joint business is admitted, and the complainant (a partnor) applies
fqr an adjustment of the accounts respecting it. tihe cmrt will not accept
a general denial of indebtednes; on the part of the responl,.nt however
positive, and dismiss the bill, without reference to a master for an inves-
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tigation of accounts, notwithstanding such denial may be accompanied
with a statement of circumstances rendering it probable that, as to such
respondent, the denial may prove well founded; especially, when the
respondent does not assert his full knowledge of all the details of the
accounts. The master to whom the case is referred may receive proof
that the partnership transactions extended over a longer period of time
than that specified in the answer: Lawrence v. Rokes, 61 Me.
While the court, in equity, will ordinarily give full effect to the statutes of limitation, in so doing it acts in obedience to the spirit of those
statutes, anul " rather 'upon the reason and principles on which, as positive rules, they are founded-, than the rules themselves ;" so that, if, by
the laches of the complainant, the respondents have lost their evidence,
or are placed in a disadvantageous position, the court will deal with the
remedy as if barred in equity, even although the full term of the Statute of Limitations may not have elapsed; and, on the other hand, where
there has been no change in the condition and position of the parties,
and peculiar eircumstances appear to justify the delay, appropriate relief will not be refused, although a strict application of limitation rules
might seeni to require it; certainly not where the respondent admits
the reception of firm assets within six years : Id.
To operate as a bar, the benefit of the statute must be expressly
claimed in the answer : Id.
Whether actions of" account at law, and the analogous remedy by bill
in equity are now subject to any other than the.general limitations of
twenty years, qu.Tre P I.
The making, or omission to make, a demand before filing the bill,
only affects the question of costs; especially where the answer shows
such a difference between the parties as to indicate that a demand would
be a mere fruitless formality : Id.
PLEADING.
Complabint for Flowage-Failureto allege Title to Lan.-A
complaint Tr flowage containing no allegation of defendant's ownership of
the land on which the dam was erected, held bad on demurrer: Jones
v. Skhinner, 61 Me.
Ameadrmnt-NL .w Count to Declaration-Nw Cause of Action.-Tn
Maie a promissory note, or an accepted bill of exchange, is prinafticie
evidence (,fpaymelit of tile original debt for which it was given ; aliler
as to an evn.ccepted bill: hence, a new count declaring upon such debt
may lie added by way of amendment to a declaration upon an unaecepted
bill, since it introduces no new cause of action : Strang v. Ilirst, 61
MIe.
JPartnershp-Snit1,71
survining Partner-Statementin lieu of PleaUpon a debt due a partnership, one of the members of which has deceased, the action must be brought in the names of the survivors,
whether for their own benefit, or under the control of the administrator
of the deceased partner : Strang v. Ilrst, 61 Me.
An objection to plaintiff's right to maintain suit as surviving partner,
because lie has not given the bond required by law, must be taken in
abatement, or it will be considered as waived: Id.
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A brief statement under the R. S. of Maine, c. $2, § 18. is a substitute for a special plea at common law, and may be held bad fbr duplicity: Id.
RE3MOVAL OF CAUSES.
App7icationrfor Remoal-JTlhen to be mad.-Under the Act of' 17S9
the removal can only be made on application of the defendant at the
time of entering his appearance in the state court : Kingsbur, v. Khings
bury, C. C. North. Dist. Il., 3 Bissell.
.It
seems that where a case has gone to decree in the state court it is
too late for any of the parties to remove it to this court: Al.
JMinor cannot consent to Removal.-A minor is incapable of consenting to a change of forum. The state court having obtained jurisdiction
of his person and property, neither his guardian ad lilcm nor any other
person for him can consent to a removal : ILd.
SALE.

Delivery-Statute of Frauds.-If it be agreed that goods sold shall
be hauled by the vendor to a place specified, it does not necessarily follow that the title thereto does not pass till they reach the place designated. The property may pass so as to take the case out of the Statute
of Frauds, at the time the agreement ismade, if the parties so intend;
and whether or not such was their intention, in any given case, is a
question for the jury, to be determined from the words, acts and conduct of the parties, and all the circumstances: Dyer v. Libby, 61 Me.
STA IP.

Omission of-Intent to defraud the Revenue.-The assignment of a
mortgage of ieal estate in October 1863, not stamped as then required
by the laws of the United States, is not therefore void unless it appear
that the stamp was omitted with intent to defraud the revenue : Dela v.
Stanwood, 61 Me.
SURETY.

.Paymentof the Debt by Surety's ANotA.-If a surety give his notes
to the creditor under an agreement, not known to the principal, that
when paid they shall be in full satisfaction of the original debt, and
part only of the notes are paid; this does not discharge the principal,
who may be sued upon the original contract and held for so much as
remains due thereon after deducting the amounts paid by the surety:
Emery v. Richardson, 61 )ie.
TAX-PAYERS.

Rigit to restrain Acts of .Muicipal Authorities.-A tax-payer, at
large, of a municipality, having no private interest in the question, more
than. other tax-payers, cannot maintain an action in equity, as against
the public authorities, to set aside or prevent acts claimed to be illegal:
Tift v. The City of Bufalo, 65 Barb.
In an action brought by the plaintiff in behalf of himself and other
tax-payers of a city, to restrain the common council from selling to a
lhotel company a park or square, in said city, called ",Court-House
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Square," the complainant did not allege that the plaintiff owned any
land froting on said park ; and although he was a resident citizen and
a tax-payer in said city, and owned land in the vicinity of said park,
he had tio interest in such park or square. more than tile
citizens generally of the ,ity: Idd, that tile plaintiff had no standing in a court
of equity entitling him to maintain the action; and that an injunction
issued therein, was improperly granted and continued: I1.
Altiough it has been held, in many cases, that a tax-payer cannot
maintain tn acti,,n in his own name, to restrain the collection of a tax
assessed up-i the inhabitants of a town, village or city of which he is
a residet. nor to set aside the proceedings of' municipal corpolrations

which only affct him as they do other inhabitants of such corporation;
yet he call nAiLtain such an action when he sustains some specific injury: 7';t l'c,,le ex rel. Akin v. Morgan,et al., 65 Barb.
Gertiorud-It

does not follow that because a tax-payer may not main-

tain ai,:,ctil to restrain the assessment or collection of a tax, or to

restrain (- .,ct ai~ile proceeditigs of a municipal corporation, lie may not
be entitled to a certioratrito review the proceedings of those who assessed
the tax, or 1 'erflrmied the corporate act, and to set it aside if found to
have bec-en
d ine in violation of law : Id.
The deeision of assessors, in proceedings under the statute for the
bonding or towns in aid of a railroad, that the consents or the requisite
number it'
tax-payers have been obtained, &e., is a judicial decision, and
may be reviewed by certiorari,at the suit of a tax-payer: Id.
TRESPASS.

Title to Locus in Quo-Evidence.-Tin an action of tr1eqpa.s quare
daustnm evil.nee is admissible that the deed by which plaintiff claims
title to the locss i quo, though executed and recorded prior to the date
of the( writ. was not delivered till after suit brought: MAfaxwell v.
Mitchell, tllMe.
Evidtnee reported upon a motion for new trial, which has been overruled by
cannot be considered in a hearing upon exceptions
caet.
not reftrring to such testimony: Mt.
TRUSTEE.

Under M,irri;ge Settlement-Change of Investment-Relief of Trustee from Luiti.'.-Where by the terms of' a marriage settlement, the
trustee is t - el-ge the investment of the trust funds upon the joint
request in writi., of the cestui que trust and her husband, such written
request is vs-e,ial to relieve the trustee front liability for loss arising
from any chtange of investment made by him: (ocker v. Perce. 61
Me.
If, aftr the letermination of the trust by the death of the husband,
in an ailjui.tincvit between the trustee and the beneficiary of the matters

of the trust, there be in the property conveyed to her as the consideration ot lir release to the trustee, an "inadequacy of price and ineq u ality I," advantages in the bargain," equity will set aside the release
so obtUained and afford relief: P,.
UNITED STATES COURTS.

See Eminent Domain.

